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CAN THE LIBERAL ORDER BE SUSTAINED? 
NATIONS, NETWORK EFFECTS, AND THE 
EROSION OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS
Bryan H. Druzin∗
I.  Introduction
Economists recognize two kinds of value: value derived directly from a 
product (e.g., the value of a hammer or a pencil) and network value, value 
that flows from other people’s use of that thing (e.g., a language or money). 
A hammer has value regardless of how many other people use hammers. 
Languages, currencies, times zones, and the Internet, on the other hand, pos-
sess network value. Their value flows from the fact that they are networks. 
Consider for a moment the value of a language that only one person speaks, 
or a currency that only one person uses, or a private social media platform, a 
private time zone, or a one-person Internet. While a currency that only one 
person uses or a language that only one person speaks is useless, the inverse 
is also true: As more people employ a currency or speak a language, the 
more useful the currency or language become. Because of this, networks 
have a way of trapping in their users. Unlike a pencil or hammer, which you 
can just throw away for another, there is a silent pressure that prevents users 
from easily leaving networks because they will lose access to the network. 
For example, users of Facebook or the English language are effectively 
locked into these networks. In the case of Facebook, users would lose access 
to an online network of other Facebook users. In the case of English, speak-
ers would lose the ability to communicate with a vast network of other Eng-
lish speakers and operate in the English-speaking world. In both examples, 
the prospect of losing access to the network locks each of its users into the 
network and helps keep them there. Although they are technically free to 
leave, network effect pressure prevents them from doing so. Whether we 
realize it or not, we are in fact imprisoned within networks of time, words, 
social media, and currencies. While we may scarcely notice their force op-
erating upon us, a pressure is locking us into these constructs. It is only 
when we try to leave a network—say speak a language where it is not spo-
ken or use a foreign currency where it is not accepted—that this power sud-
denly reveals itself.
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While it may not be immediately obvious, the ability of networks to 
lock in their users directly relates to the question this article seeks to answer. 
The question is this: Given the growing disruption to the international sys-
tem, how can we strengthen the institutions that sustain international order? 
How we answer this question is of cardinal importance. The liberal interna-
tional order forged by the United States in the aftermath of World War II is 
now under its deepest and most sustained pressure since its inception. A 
global rise in populism and hyper-nationalism is triggering a retreat from 
multilateralism that is destabilizing this governance structure.
1
We are fac-
ing a breakdown, perhaps even a potential collapse, in global governance. 
While imperfect, this patchwork of institutions, international organizations, 
and the multilateral treaties that establish them has promoted global cooper-
ation and spearheaded the advance of international law for the past seventy 
years.
2
Yet, the constancy of this order can no longer be taken for granted.
3
From climate change, to international security, technological disruption, and 
global pandemics, we face challenges that can only be solved through inter-
1. The relation between populism and the crisis of multilateralism (mostly reflected in 
several recent withdrawals from multilateral treaties) has been and continues to be widely dis-
cussed. To cite just one recent compelling article on the subject, see John Ikenberry, The End 
of the Liberal International Order?, 94 INT’L AFFS. 7, 16 (2018) (discussing the extent to 
which the liberal international order is being undermined by far right populism and extreme 
nationalism, and the resilience of liberal internationalism in the face of these challenges).
2. A brief note on the article’s terminology: I use the terms ‘international organiza-
tion’ and ‘international institution’ (or simply organization or institution) interchangeably to 
refer to any organizational arrangement that involves three or more states. What is primarily 
meant here is intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs”) such as the United Nations and its 
agencies. However, the term is also employed more broadly to include multilateral treaties not 
traditionally seen as international organizations, such as basic trade agreements (e.g., 
“NAFTA”), security agreements, as well as any kind of international treaty-based regime in-
volving three or more states that produces an organizational structure. The reader should note 
that this is a departure from how many contemporary theorists now use these terms. Interna-
tional organizations are commonly understood as entities, and international institutions are 
understood as norms or rules. Employing the terms interchangeably is a somewhat older us-
age, but I do so because the term international organization alone does not entirely capture 
what I am expressing. The line between institution and organization is not as clear as some 
theorists contend—many agreements have organizational structures that, while not technically 
international organizations, capture many of the aspects of formally recognized international 
organizations. See, e.g., Beth Simmons & Lisa Martin, International Organizations and Insti-
tutions, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 326, 326 (Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, & Beth A Simmons, eds., 2013) (differentiating between the terms ‘interna-
tional organizations’ and ‘institutions’).
3. In the first two decades of this century, the number of new multilateral organiza-
tions has declined dramatically. The postwar period, which saw the creation of the United Na-
tions (“UN”) system and its specialized agencies and programs, a proliferation of IGOs, mas-
sive expansion of European institutions, and a surge in the number of multilateral treaties, is 
losing momentum. The growth in “the number of IGOs has . . . decreased by about 20 per-
cent. Adoption of new environmental treaties has slowed even more sharply.” Kenneth W. 
Abbott, Jessica F. Green & Robert O. Keohane, Organizational Ecology and Institutional 
Change in Global Governance, 70 INT. ORG. 247, 247 (2016).
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national coordination, yet multilateralism is faltering precisely when we 
need it most. If we assume the rules-based international order is worth sav-
ing (which this article does),
4
the question is: How? Applying network theo-
ry to this crisis in governance, this article argues that policymakers can 
strengthen multilateral institutions by leveraging the network effect pres-
sures they naturally generate to lock states more firmly into international 
organizations central to the liberal order, such as the United Nations 
(“UN”), the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), the International Mone-
tary Fund (“IMF”), and so on. The basic idea is to exploit the latent struc-
tural power of network effect pressures to shore up these institutions so that 
they can weather this period of global instability until the international sys-
tem rebalances itself and settles once again into a new but stable equilibri-
um.
Network effect pressure is the structural force I was describing in the 
first paragraph. It is present whenever the value that one user derives from a 
given network is tied to how many other users also use the network.
5
For 
our purposes, the key dynamic produced by network effect pressure is its 
lock-in effect. As I described, lock-in occurs when users become unable to 
unplug from a network without incurring a loss and so become ‘locked’ into 
the network. Just like Facebook or the English language, international or-
ganizations are networks of actors that generate network effects like lock-in. 
While states participate in institutions for a variety of reasons, network ef-
fect pressures are always present, gently influencing their choices and deci-
sions. States can become locked into organizations when the cost of non-
participation (in terms of loss of benefit and cost of switching) grows too 
4. Some readers may disagree for a variety of reasons. I take up this issue in the arti-
cle’s conclusion, offering a brief discussion of the disadvantages to maintaining the current 
system. This article, however, is predicated on the notion that the Western liberal order is in-
deed worth saving, and that more benefit may be gleaned from preserving it than by allowing 
it to unravel.
5. For the foundational literature on network effects and the related concept of path 
dependence, see P. A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 
335 (1985) (defining path dependence as a process that is influenced by temporally remote 
events, which may include mere random events); M. L. Katz & C. Shapiro, Network External-
ities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (providing a static 
model of markets in which consumption externalities dominate); W. Brian Arthur, Competing 
Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 116 
(1989) (an early study of the dynamics of allocation in situation of increasing returns in which 
agents choose between technologies competing for adoption); W. Brian Arthur, Positive 
Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92 (1990) [hereinafter Positive Feedbacks] (dis-
cussing the theory of positive feedback); W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND 
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY 13 (1994) [hereinafter PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE 
ECONOMY] (providing a view of economics that incorporates path dependence and increasing 
returns); see also Paul A. David, Why Are Institutions the ‘Carriers of History’?: Path De-
pendence and the Evolution of Conventions, Organizations and Institutions, 5 STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE AND ECON. DYNAMICS 205, 205 (1994) (applying the concept of path dependence to 
the evolution of human organizations and institutions, drawing an analogy between technolog-
ical systems and human organizations).
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high, the organization is simply the only viable game in town, or both. Just 
as Facebook is a network for social media users and English is a network for 
people wishing to communicate, a multilateral institution is a network that 
enables coordination between states to achieve some benefit.
6
The ultimate 
value of multilateral treaties and the international organizations they estab-
lish is not value derived directly from a product—it is network value. A 
treaty to which only one state is a signatory has as much value as a language 
that only one person speaks. And so, just like for Facebook and English, 
network effect pressure can be quite powerful in the case of multilateral in-
stitutions.
7
Yet for those unfamiliar with the literature on network effects, it 
may be difficult to really appreciate their force.
Consider the UN. The UN system is riddled with shortcomings, yet it 
has held up remarkably well.
8
A key explanation for its staying power, I 
submit, is the network effect pressure the UN system is generating in terms 
of both size and scope, together with the fact that it is really the only game 
in town. This makes it challenging for even the most disaffected state to un-
plug from it, something no nation has ever done in the UN’s seventy-five-
year history. Likewise, the WTO generates massive network effect pressure 
that make it functionally impossible for any advanced economy to withdraw 
from it at this point. Despite growing worries about trade liberalization, eve-
ry major economy now conducts their commercial intercourse according to 
the WTO’s conventions.
9
The network effect pressure and lock-in effect of 
the European Union (“EU”) is so powerful that it required a four-year her-
6. The word ‘benefit’ is used throughout the discussion as an umbrella term that 
means any form of benefit member states derive from an international organization.
7. Indeed, the lock-in effect generated by network effect pressures is often so strong 
that the majority of international organizations do not dissolve even after they stop serving 
much functional purpose. Rather, they simply lapse into inactivity while their institutional 
husk lingers on (with their membership largely intact). On the idea that international organiza-
tions tend to organizationally persist, see S. Strange, Why Do International Organizations 
Never Die?, in AUTONOMOUS POLICY MAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 216,
217 (B. Reinalda et al. eds., 2018); see also R. O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY:
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 101–07 (1984); Cheryl 
Shanks, Harold K. Jacobson & Jeffrey H. Kaplan, Inertia and Change in the Constellation of 
IGOs, 1981-1992, 50 INT. ORG. 593, 593–627 (1996); ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS 
COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 51 (1990); M. N. 
Barnett & M. Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organiza-
tions, 53 INT. ORG. 699, 699 (1999); P. Bernholz, Are International Organizations Like the 
Bank for International Settlements Unable to Die? 4 REV. INT. ORG. 361, 362–64 (2009).
8. Perceived shortcomings of the UN range from the organization’s inequality of rep-
resentation, an inability to enforce its rulings, bureaucratic bloat, the inability to prevent 
armed conflict (as outlined in Article 1 of the UN Charter), to charges of corruption, moral 
relativism, and anti-Semitism. For a good discussion of the main criticisms of the UN, see 
JOHN E. TRENT, MODERNIZING THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: CIVIL SOCIETY’S ROLE IN 
MOVING FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 109–157 (2007).
9. DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION
234 (2008).
Fall 2020] Can The Liberal Order Be Sustained? 5
culean effort for the UK to wrench itself from the union, the implications of 
which are still unclear. These are just a few high-profile examples.
While it varies in intensity, all international organizations generate net-
work lock-in to some degree. The more intense the network effect pressure, 
the greater its lock-in effect. In some cases, this may be weak. In others, this 
may be strong. But in all cases, the effect is open to strategic manipulation. 
To that end, this article offers a suite of strategies policymakers can use to 
exploit this untapped repository of power and boost an organization’s lock-
in effect—an approach I call treaty hacking. Treaty hacking offers a toolkit 
from which policymakers can draw to help sustain multilateral governance 
through this period of global instability. The article’s contribution to the lit-
erature lies here. While lock-in has been explored in the economics and po-
litical science literature in relation to path dependence,
10
to my knowledge, 
no one has outlined specific strategies to strengthen the cohesion of interna-
tional organizations and the multilateral treaties that establish them by ma-
nipulating their network effect pressures in order to intensify their lock-in 
effect. The literature traditionally sees lock-in as a problem: Actors become 
‘locked’ into an institutional arrangement, which allows sub-optimal ar-
rangements to persist in a path-dependent manner where they would other-
wise be improved upon or replaced. This article, however, sees lock-in as 
something that can be used.
One of the main obstacles to sustaining multilateralism is the inherent 
rigidity of treaties.
11
Once in place, it is very difficult to amend a multilat-
eral treaty. Formal amendment usually requires states to go through a long 
and protracted ratification process. This presents a challenge in situations 
where compliance is weakening. It is difficult to strengthen a failing organi-
zation by tweaking its constituent treaty because many states will just exit 
the agreement. Most of our major international organizations were estab-
lished decades ago, making these treaties very tricky to revisit, especially if 
commitment is already flagging. But while it is difficult to alter them direct-
ly, we can indirectly strengthen these treaties by manipulating the network 
effect pressures of the organizations they establish to increase their lock-in 
effect. Intensifying an organization’s lock-in effect is a sort of backdoor into 
its treaty—a way to ‘hack’ into a treaty. Hence the term: ‘treaty hacking.’
10. Path dependence is the idea that institutions or technologies tend, over time, to de-
velop along specific constraining growth trajectories (i.e. paths) as a consequence of their 
structural properties or commonly held beliefs and values. In its simplest form, path depend-
ence is the contention that ‘history matters.’ For further elaboration, see infra note 22. For its 
application in the political science literature (as well as in other disciplines like historical in-
stitutionalism), see infra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
11. International organizations are established by treaties. However, in some cases, an-
other agreement acts as a charter and gives them standing under international law. Internation-
al organizations can also spawn other sub-organizations, the UN’s specialized agencies being 
a prime example. Moreover, international organizations may themselves be a party to and may 
administer multiple treaties (the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), for example, adminis-
ters numerous international treaties).
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This treaty-hacking approach requires us to view the international sys-
tem in an entirely different light, to see it as a ‘market’ in which internation-
al organizations, in function if not in intention, lock in countries like firms 
competing in markets with strong network effects lock in their customers. I 
invite the reader to view the evolution of the liberal international order pre-
cisely in these terms. The basic argument is that because global institutions 
produce positive feedback and lock-in effects just like any other networked 
market, policymakers can adopt many of the same strategies that firms de-
ploy when competing in such markets to help shore up these institutions. 
While the extent to which treaty hacking can prevent institutional collapse is 
an open question, even minor effects can be consequential in the right cir-
cumstances. The claim here is not that network lock-in is some impervious 
bulwark against member withdrawal. Rather, the argument is that intensify-
ing network lock-in can strengthen an organization and render such with-
drawal less likely. In some circumstances, intensifying an organization’s
lock-in effect may prove to be the key element in preventing a faltering 
multilateral institution from completely unraveling.
Assuming that the international system is a networked market, it may be 
only deceptively stable. Institutions within such markets may appear robust 
when they are not. While network effects produce positive feedback and ex-
ponential growth, they can likewise trigger exponential decay and sudden 
collapse.
12
It may be the case that the liberal international order and its insti-
tutions are in fact far weaker than they appear. They may be teetering on an 
invisible brink, a tipping point, where a small shock may cause them to col-
lapse with astonishing speed. Without a proper understanding of network 
effect pressures and network lock-in, it is simply impossible to accurately 
assess the genuine robustness of these institutions. Appraising the deeper 
structural forces at play may also prove useful when crafting new treaties: 
Policymakers can design treaties to maximize their lock-in effect thus mak-
ing them more resistant to collapse. This structural approach can also help 
explain why some international organizations succeed while others sputter 
and fail. Although not developed here, this is an interesting and potentially 
fruitful research program that may advance our understanding of how global 
governance evolves more generally.
13
12. A system generates positive feedback when “a change in one variable leads to a 
further change in that same variable, and in the same direction.” GREWAL, supra note 9, at 25.
13. The model may be particularly useful to theorists working in the area of organiza-
tional studies—specifically, in its subfield of organization ecology. Drawing from disciplines 
like biology, economics, and sociology, organizational ecology seeks to identify the factors 
that cause organizations to emerge, grow, and die using statistical analysis. For the founda-
tional literature in organization ecology, see Michael T. Hannan & John Freeman, The Popu-
lation Ecology of Organizations, 82 AM. J. SOC. 929, 929 (1977) (formulating a theory of 
population ecology); MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY
3 (1989) (articulating a clear model of organizational ecology). For a good summary work on 
organizational ecology, see MICHAEL T. HANNAN, LÁSZLÓ PÓLOS, & GLENN R. CARROLL, 
Fall 2020] Can The Liberal Order Be Sustained? 7
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the model’s two 
key concepts: network effects and network lock-in. Part II then examines 
ways in which we can roughly gauge the strength of an organization’s net-
work effect pressure. This is possible because, whatever other variables are 
at play, on a basic structural level, network effect pressures are always pre-
sent. Part III—the most important part of the article—then offers specific 
strategies that may be deployed to boost an organization’s network effect 
pressure and amplify its lock-in effect. The final section concludes, discuss-
ing limitations to the model.
II. THE MODEL’S TWO KEY CONCEPTS: NETWORK EFFECTS AND 
NETWORK LOCK-IN
A. Network Effects
The standard definition of a network effect is a situation in which the 
value of a product or service increases as the number of other agents using 
the product or service grows.
14
Commonly cited examples of network ef-
fects in the economics literature include such things as telephone networks, 
railway gauges, credit cards, videotape standards, currencies, electrical out-
lets, even screw thread sizes.
15
Users of these standards form a network, and 
in each case, positive feedback causes users to coalesce around the standard 
and then lock into use of that standard unable to exit the network without 
incurring significant costs. Language illustrates the dynamic well. As a re-
sult of language’s naturally powerful network effect pressures, people are 
locked into particular linguistic networks. Not only are there the obvious 
costs associated with learning a new language (what are known as switching 
costs), if a person ceases speaking a language, they will lose access to that 
linguistic network (its network benefit).
16
If you are, for example, the inhab-
LOGICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY: AUDIENCES, CODES, AND ECOLOGIES (2007) (providing 
a comprehensive overview of the various theories and methods active in the research area).
14. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externalities, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671, 671 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
Some of this section draws from other work by Liebowitz. See Andrea K. Bjorklund & Bryan 
Druzin, Institutional Lock-in Within the Field of International Investment Arbitration, 39 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 707, 716 (2018).
15. For a very good overview of other network effect examples in a wide range of con-
texts, see JOSEPH FERRELL & PAUL KLEMPERER, COORDINATION AND LOCK-IN:
COMPETITION WITH SWITCHING COSTS AND NETWORK EFFECTS 46–54 (2006). For other var-
ied applications of the concept, see, e.g., D. Foray, The Dynamic Implications of Increasing 
Returns: Technological Change and Path Dependent Inefficiency, 15 INT. J. INDUS. ORG. 733
(1997); James Simmie, Path Dependence and New Technological Path Creation in the Danish 
Wind Power Industry, EUR. PLAN. STUD. 753 (2012).
16. I am ignoring for the moment the concept of ‘multi-homing’ (the ability to switch 
between networks), which in the context of language would take the form of bilingualism. I 
return to the concept of multi-homing later in the discussion.
8 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:1
itant of an isolated Chinese village that speaks only Mandarin, while you are 
technically free to speak any language you please, in practice you are not: 
You are locked into speaking Mandarin. It is a choice already made for 
you.
17
This dynamic may also be applied to international multilateral organiza-
tions. In its most straightforward application, the benefits of institutional 
membership—be they economic integration, facilitating trade, the setting of 
common standards, or the provision of security—increase with each addi-
tional member. As this occurs, the benefits of participation (and thus the 
cost of non-participation) begin to lock actors into the organization. Indeed, 
a strong argument could be made that network effect pressures were a sig-
nificant contributor to the robust and steady increase in inter-governmental 
organizations (“IGO”) membership throughout the 20th century (see Figure 
1 below).
Figure 1. This figure shows the average number of IGOs shared by a 
pair of countries, 1885-2000. Apart from a pronounced dip in the period 
preceding the Second World War, the last century saw a persistent growth 
in state participation in IGOs.
18
Figure 1
17. We may, however, “interpret the idea of network effects much more broadly than 
the economics literature in which this concept originated has done.” Indeed, we can “under-
stand network effects as the positive externalities that are generated in the interdependence of 
action, the positive feedback that results from the use of [any] standard.” This includes not 
only standards of technical coordination, but also any kind of standard that facilitates coordi-
nation between networks of actors. The concept’s true scope of potential application is thus 
massive. See GREWAL, supra note 9, at 66.
18. Source data from B. RUSSET & J. O’NEAL, TRIANGULATING PEACE: DEMOCRACY,
INTERDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2001).
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While in the case of some organizations there may be disadvantages to 
over-expansion, this ‘bigger-is-better principle’ generally holds true.
19
Like 
language, in the case of international organizations, increasing returns gen-
erate network effects, which then usually produce lock-in.
B. Network Lock-in
The concept of lock-in is central to the literature on path dependence.
20
The idea of path dependence was first developed in the social sciences in 
the context of technological standards, but has since been applied to a wide 
range of subjects, including economic geography, evolutionary economics, 
political science, historical sociology, and law.
21
Douglass C. North’s work 
19. For a discussion of the perils of overexpansion with respect to the EU, see infra 
Figure 8 and surrounding text. Even in cases where over-enlargement of the network may 
begin producing diminishing returns past a particular threshold, network effects will drive an 
organization’s expansion up to that point. The potential limits of network enlargement are dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part III.
20. For a rigorous unpacking of the concept of path dependence, see Scott E. Page, 
Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 (2006). While the terms ‘increasing returns’ and ‘posi-
tive feedback’ are used interchangeably here, Scott notes a technical distinction between them. 
Id. at 88.
21. The literature on path dependence and its attendant concept of lock-in is vast. How-
ever, for a glimpse of its application across various disciplines (with specific emphasis on its 
application in the legal literature), the following resources are valuable. In economics, see, 
e.g., Paul Krugman, History and Industry Location: The Case of the Manufacturing Belt, 81 
AM. ECON. REV. 80, 80 (1991) (discussing path dependence in economic geography, citing 
specific historical examples); PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 10 (1991) (citing the 
importance of economic geography in the context of geographical economics); DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 73–104
(1990) (setting forth the concept of institutional lock-in as an impediment to economic devel-
opment); David, supra note 5, at 334. In political science, see P. Pierson, Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 251 (2000) [hereinaf-
ter Increasing Returns] (applying the increasing returns literature to politics institutions, argu-
ing that political development is thus punctuated by critical events that invariably shape its 
future development); P. Pierson, Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political 
Processes, 14 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 72, 72 (2000) [hereinafter Timing and Sequence]; 
GREWAL, supra note 9, at 228 (Employing network effects and lock-in as an analytical 
framework for globalization). In sociology, see James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Histori-
cal Sociology, 29 THEORY AND SOC’Y 507, 507 (2000). In law, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path 
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System,
86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606 (2001) (discussing path dependence and lock-in generating ineffi-
ciencies when legal rules become stuck, unable to evolve to changing conditions—which has 
weighty implications for the doctrine of stare decisis); Paul A. David, Intellectual Property 
Institutions and the Panda’s Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and Trade Secrets in Economic 
Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 19 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee & Roberta A. 
Schoen eds., 1993) (discussing path dependency with respect to intellectual property law); 
Richard A. Posner, Path-Dependency, Pragmatism, and a Critique of History in Adjudication 
and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 583 (2000) (examining the use of history to 
analyze adjudication and legal scholarship); S.J. Liebowitz & S. E. Margolis, The Fable of the 
Keys, 30 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1990) (challenging the veracity of the lock-in effect by critically 
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in the area, however, is perhaps the most well-known. North argues that in-
creasing returns produce lock-in vis-à-vis institutions, a dynamic he terms 
‘institutional lock-in’ (for which he won a Nobel Prize in 1993).
22
North ar-
gues that institutions become more entrenched over time and, as a conse-
quence, difficult to dislodge.
23
Path dependence envisions institutional evo-
lution something like raindrops running down a pane of glass—as they col-
collect together they form larger pools of water that forge a downward path 
that is progressively more difficult to redirect as it runs farther down the 
glass.
North identifies several sources of increasing returns with respect to the 
growth of institutions, which he adapts from the earlier work of Brian Ar-
thur on technological lock-in
24
These include high start-up costs involved in 
scrutinizing the oft-cited example of lock-in—the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard de-
sign over the more efficient Dvorak design); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path De-
pendence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205 (1995) (discussing three dif-
ferent forms of path dependence and their potential to generate market errors and lock-in); 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership 
and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999) (articulating a theory of the path depend-
ence of corporate structure); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corpo-
rate Contracting, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 347, 349 (1996) (discussing how agency costs and 
behavioral biases can lead to standardization in corporate contracting); Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 763 (1995) 
(examining the impact of network externalities in corporate contracts); Mark J. Roe, Chaos 
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, 
Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (1996); 
Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 479, 482 (1998); C. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L REV.
813, 820 (1998); C. Gillette, Harmony and Stasis in Trade Usage for International Sales, 39 
VA. J. INT’L L. 707, 711–12 (1999); D.L. Burk, Law as a Network Standard, 8 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 63, 72 (2006); Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of Fo-
rum, and Network Externalities 18 TULANE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 131 (2009) [hereinafter 
Buying Commercial Law] (arguing that network effects induce standardization in choice of 
law and choice of forum clauses in transnational commercial contracts); Bryan Druzin, Why 
Does Soft Law Have any Power Anyway? 7 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 361, 362 (2016) (arguing that 
many areas of soft law exhibit strong network effects which render it uniquely calibrated to 
induce voluntary adoption).
22. See NORTH, supra note 21, at 103 (positing that institutional development may pro-
duce a path-dependent pattern of development over time); see also Increasing Returns, supra
note 21, at 251 (arguing political institutions are particularly vulnerable to this process); Tim-
ing and Sequence, supra note 21, at 72 (arguing that systematically situating particular politi-
cal moments in a temporal sequence of events and processes will aid us in our understanding 
of complex social dynamics); Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insight from Com-
parative Historical Analysis, in COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 208, 208–40 (James Mahoney & Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003) (discussing the 
“feedback mechanisms” that steer institutional and policy trajectories over time).
23. NORTH, supra note 21, at 95.
24. Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97–100 (1991). For North, 
‘institutions’ are “informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” North distinguishes institu-
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setting up alternative institutions from scratch, significant learning effects 
for an organization, coordination effects driven by direct interconnection 
with other organizations and indirectly through complementary activities, 
and reduction in uncertainty regarding the permanency of specific rules aris-
ing from their increasing prevalence and use (what is known in the literature 
as ‘adaptive expectations’).
25
Collectively, these features, North argues, 
generate “an institutional matrix [that] produces massive increasing re-
turns,”
26
bringing about institutional lock-in. North’s focus is on the evolu-
tionary inefficiencies that path dependence may produce as a consequence 
of organizations being unable to abandon institutions, which may lead to so-
cietal stagnation and decline.
Although similar, my argument should not be confused with North’s. I 
am not concerned here with how organizations become locked into rules 
(‘institutions’, as North calls them); rather, I am interested in how states be-
come locked into organizations.27 As such, the present thesis draws more 
from the literature on strategic competition in winner-take-all markets—
what is colloquially known as ‘standards wars’—than it does from the path 
dependence literature.
28
What is proposed here is the strategic exploitation 
of network effect pressures to lock states into multilateral organizations and 
the treaties that underpin them. That is, however, not to suggest that the suc-
cess and failure of an organization can be chalked up solely to network ef-
fect pressures—network effect pressure alone is seldom enough to sustain 
an institution. Indeed, currencies are abandoned and languages die, and they 
do so due to a host of factors unrelated to network lock-in. However, net-
work effect pressure is a ubiquitous force that undergirds networked institu-
tions from organizations: institutions are the rules of the game and organizations are akin to 
sports teams playing the game constrained by these rules.
25. See NORTH, supra note 21, at 95; Positive Feedbacks, supra note 5, at 95; Path De-
pendence in the Economy, supra note 5, at 112.
26. NORTH, supra note 21, at 95.
27. A minor but important semantic point should be restated here in the context of 
North’s work: The term ‘institution’ is understood in the present article in its more generic 
sense, as an organizational framework that regulates the interaction of its members. In this 
case the term refers to the international institutions of global governance. This is distinct from 
how the term is used in political economy, specifically new institutionalism (where it con-
notes a rule or convention rather than an organization). Used in this sense, institutions are bet-
ter understood as “a special type of social structure that involves potentially codifiable and . . .
normative rules of interpretation and behavior.” Geoffrey M. Hodgson, What Are Institu-
tions?, 11 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 4 (2006). This understanding of institutions can be traced back 
to Thorstein Veblen in the early literature on institutionalism—Veblen defined institutions as 
the “settled habits of thought common to the generality of men.” Thorstein Veblen, The Limi-
tations of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 626 (1909).
28. For the foundational literature on standards wars and firm competition in networked 
markets, see, e.g., Carl Shapiro & Hal Varian, The Art of Standard Wars, 41 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 8 (1999); see also Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Ef-
fects, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 93, 96 (1994); Stanley Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to 
Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117, 124–26 (1994).
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tions and is therefore an ever-present mechanism that can be exploited. It 
usually takes a powerful exogenous shock for people to abandon a currency, 
as it does for a language to quickly die. It took a four-year civil war to ren-
der the Confederate States dollar worthless, and history has shown that it 
often takes a genocide to fully extinguish a language. While there are many 
variables that determine state compliance with a treaty, network effect pres-
sures and lock-in play a non-trivial role, and, in the right circumstances, 
may be critical in preventing an institution from unraveling.
III. ASSESSING INSTITUTIONAL NETWORK EFFECT PRESSURE AND 
NETWORK LOCK-IN
Network effect pressures vary between international organizations, 
ranging from a minor pulse to a powerful binding force. Yet, by virtue of 
their networked character, all international organizations possess some de-
gree of network effect pressure. There are indicators we can use to gauge 
the intensity of this pressure that, taken together, allow us—albeit on a very 
general level—to make a broad-stroke assessment of an organization’s lock-
in effect. While it is difficult to assess the precise degree of lock-in that an 
organization is generating, it is possible to get an approximate fix on it, par-
ticularly where the gap between institutions is extreme. Below I discuss four 
general indicators of network effect pressure. These concepts will prove 
useful in the section that follows when I outline the specific treaty-hacking 
strategies.
A. Network Benefit and ‘Thickness’
Foremost among these is the most obvious: How crucial is the benefit 
that states gain from participating in the international organization? This 
will vary depending on the nature of the organization and the purpose it 
serves. For example, there is a substantial difference between the benefit 
gleaned from membership in an organization that provides international se-
curity, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and an in-
stitution that merely establishes common postal standards, the mandate of 
the Universal Postal Union (“UPU”). Obviously, the network benefit is far 
more critical to national governments in the case of the former than the lat-
ter.
29
The more crucial this network benefit, the greater the cost of abandon-
ing the organization.
29. In the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), the benefit will, 
of course, vary depending on how serious the threat of being attacked is for a given state. 
However, even if the probability is low, because the consequences of conflict are potentially 
high, national security usually is of greater concern even if a state may use the international 
mail system on a far more frequent basis. This is not, however, to suggest that the Universal 
Postal Union (“UPU”) does not possess significant network effect pressures. It, in fact, boasts 
a fair degree of network lock-in due to its high level of ‘market consolidation’ and the  need 
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It is, however, not only a matter of the importance of the benefit; the 
sheer number of benefits provided by an organization is also significant. I 
refer to this as an organization’s thickness. International organizations pro-
vide what we may call their primary benefit (e.g. security in the case of 
NATO). However, international organizations usually provide multiple ben-
efits to its members. While these benefits may differ considerably in term of 
their importance, one would be hard-pressed to find an international organi-
zation that offered only a single benefit to its members. The thickness of in-
ternational organizations ranges greatly. For instance, the UN, the WTO, 
and the EU provide a deep well of benefits to their member states that touch 
on a wide array of issue areas, many of which are of critical importance.
30
This may be contrasted with an organization such as the Nuclear Energy 
Agency (“NEA”), which assists member states in the peaceful development 
of nuclear energy. While the NEA provides numerous benefits to its mem-
bers, 
31
comparatively, the NEA is not nearly as ‘thick’ as the UN, the 
WTO, or the EU.
Typically, the richer the tapestry of interconnections created and the 
broader the range of issue areas addressed by an organization, the greater 
the number of network benefits it will provide to its members. The more 
benefits an organization creates, the greater an organization’s thickness—
the greater its thickness, the greater its network effect pressure. This is be-
cause the lock-in effect will be stronger if the benefits, in terms of both their 
importance and their number, are greater.
32
B. Network Size and ‘Market Share’
Another important factor for assessing the intensity of network effects 
is the size of the network. When it comes to network effects, size matters. In 
general, the bigger the network in terms of the number of users, the stronger 
its lock-in effect will be. This is because, as already discussed, as a network 
for ‘synchronization’ in postal delivery, which produces coordination benefits. I discuss both 
these concepts later in the discussion.
30. For an excellent in-depth analysis of the WTO with reference to network effect 
pressures, see GREWAL, supra note 9, at 225–46 (applying a concept he coins ‘network pow-
er’ to the formation of the WTO).
31. The Nuclear Energy Agency (“NEA”) provides a range of benefits as outlined in its 
Mission Statement: “The mission of the NEA is to assist its member countries in maintaining 
and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and 
legal bases required for a safe, environmentally sound and economical use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. It strives to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common 
understandings on key issues as input to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and 
to broader OECD analyses in areas such as energy and the sustainable development of low-
carbon economies.” NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE NUCLEAR 
ENERGY AGENCY 2017-2022, 15 (2016).
32. This, however, is not the case where the primary benefit is a public good. This con-
cept is explored in greater detail later in the discussion with respect to multilateral environ-
mental agreements.
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grows, it is frequently the case that the benefit to each of its users increases 
commensurate with this growth. As it grows in membership, a security or-
ganization typically grows in power; an economic union increases in value, 
and so on. This will affect actors’ ability to exit a network. The greater ben-
efit of a larger network tends to lock actors into it. Again, language offers a 
convenient illustration. It is estimated that presently around a fifth of hu-
mankind is conversant in English.
33
As the number of English speakers in-
creases, the value of plugging into this vast linguistic network grows and, 
conversely, the cost of unplugging (permanently) from it also increases. 
Compare this with Somali. Somali is a much smaller linguistic network and 
so provides comparatively little value to speakers in the larger international 
community.
34
Somali’s lock-in effect is thus less than that of English. In-
deed, the standardization of English as the world’s de facto common tongue 
may largely be attributed to the network effect pressures and lock-in natu-
rally generated by linguistic networks.
35
Because network size is a relative concept, a crucial point here is how 
many states in the international system are consolidated into the organiza-
tion. We can understand this as ‘institutional market share.’ Institutional 
market share is the extent to which the number of states that could in theory 
participate in the organization are in fact members of the institutional ar-
rangement—that is, all the potential ‘consumers’ in the ‘institutional mar-
ket.’
36
As nearly all the states in the international system are UN members, 
the UN may be said to have captured total institutional market share. This 
may be contrasted with, for example, the EU. The EU presently comprises 
27 member states. Putting aside for the moment the EU’s obvious connec-
tion to the continent of Europe and considering it merely as a political and 
economic union, there are a remaining 168 states that, in principle, could 
33. The actual number may be as high as 1.4 billion people, of which more than 400 
million are native speakers. English is also the official language of 53 states. C.M. MILLWARD 
& MARY HAYES, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 342 (Cengage Learning, 3rd ed. 
2011). Estimates of second-language speakers vary considerably. David Crystal, Two Thou-
sand Million?, 24 ENGLISH TODAY 3, 3–6 (2008). While Mandarin and Spanish claim more 
native speakers, English is the world’s most common second language with estimates putting 
the number of second-language speakers anywhere between 100 million to 1 billion, depend-
ing on the level of proficiency specified. Some estimates put the number as high as one in eve-
ry three humans.  GREWAL, supra note 9, at 73. For a fascinating discussion of the growth of 
the English language in relation to network effects, see GREWAL, supra note 9, at 73–79.
34. There are an estimated 10-15 million speakers of Somali. PETER AUSTIN, ONE 
THOUSAND LANGUAGES: LIVING, ENDANGERED, AND LOST 70 (2008).
35. While other factors, such as British colonialism and American soft power, have no 
doubt contributed to the linguistic dominance of English on a global scale, powerful network 
effects, I would argue, have driven its expansion.
36. Thus, for example, the institutional market with reference to the NEA would com-
prise only states that are developing nuclear energy.
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join the EU.
37
The EU therefore possesses less institutional market share 
than the UN. Yet the EU’s institutional market share is much higher than in 
the case of, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”), which boasts only 10 member states. Because 185 states re-
main outside of this network, ASEAN possesses an even smaller institution-
al market share than the EU.
38
Institutional market share matters because it affects an organization’s
lock-in effect. The greater an organization’s institutional market share, gen-
erally the greater its lock-in effect. Even in cases in which the benefit pro-
vided by an organization is substantial, if there are alternative organizations 
that provide a comparable degree of benefit, then the lock-in effect will not 
be powerful. And the reverse is true: Even if the benefit provided by an or-
ganization is minimal, if it is the only game in town, then the lock-in effect 
may be extremely robust. Thus, an organization’s lock-in effect will vary 
depending on whether there are institutional alternatives available.
39
The more the market is consolidated into one organization the more dif-
ficult this ‘start-up problem’ becomes. For instance, it has become increas-
ingly difficult for a small start-up social media company to unseat Facebook 
as the dominant player in their field.
40
International organizations are no dif-
ferent. As it achieves great power status, China may desire to challenge the 
Western institutional model created by the U.S. and its allies. However, if a 
powerful state such as China or another rising power wishes at some point 
to replace an existing international organization with one that better serves 
its national interests but the incumbent organization has consolidated the 
market, the break-away state will find this difficult to pull off despite its 
newly-acquired power and influence. Consider, for instance, the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”). With 163 
signatory States and 155 States party to the ICSID Convention, ICSID pos-
37. This is, of course, little more than a thought experiment, as Article O of the Maas-
tricht Treaty explicitly restricts EU membership to European states. See Maastricht Treaty art. 
O, Nov. 1, 1993, 31 I.L.M. 247.
38. Note that while the model put forward here is decidedly state-centric, a more nu-
anced model might also consider the market as one also composed of other actors that are in-
directly involved in the network, such as other international organizations and non-state enti-
ties (e.g. civil society).
39. See GREWAL, supra note 9, at 27 (This “is always a comparative notion, based on 
the different sizes of rival networks—that is, networks based on different standards, each of 
which facilitate the same activity.”).
40. Although not impossible. For early work challenging the assumption that network 
effects induce a permanent monopoly as applied to products and services, see S. J. LIEBOWITZ 
& STEPHEN MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN 
HIGH TECHNOLOGY 135–36 (rev. ed. 2001) (arguing that, although there are indeed periods of 
persistent lock-in where a single product dominates the market—they look specifically at the 
computer software market—the market will frequently tip towards a new monopoly). The au-
thors call this process “serial monopoly.” Id. at 10.
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sesses substantial institutional market share.
41
While not impossible, a rival 
organization would likely find it a struggle to challenge ICSID’s market 
dominance because the degree to which ICSID has already consolidated the 
institutional market is high, making it difficult to unseat.
42
While in principle a state is free to exit an institutional arrangement and 
establish an alternative one, when an institution grows sufficiently large, in 
practice, a government will be as powerless to do this as an individual is to 
create their own currency or language. While possible, it requires large-
scale coordination between many (if not a majority of) the incumbent organ-
ization’s members. This is because in network effect markets a product “is 
only interesting for potential customers if a critical mass of consumers is 
reached such that the sum of original and derivative utility outweighs the 
respective costs”
43
of switching to the new product or service. If the existing 
base of users is too small, additional users will not adopt it; yet, so long as 
users will not adopt it, its base of users will remain small (a chicken-and-
egg dilemma). If an international organization has achieved total market 
consolidation, this start-up problem will be formidable. For example, be-
cause of its total market consolidation, it would be difficult for a state or 
even a small coalition of states to unilaterally abandon the UN system and 
replace it with an alternative institutional arrangement. This would require a 
massive exogenous shock, such as the outbreak of WWII, which saw the 
complete collapse of the League of Nations (“LN”) before the creation of 
the UN as its institutional replacement in the ashes of the war.
44
C.  Member Status
A third factor that may affect an organization’s lock-in effect is the sta-
tus of its member states. Status is understood here in a broad sense. It in-
cludes obvious factors such as a state’s geopolitical and economic weight. 
However, factors such as political stability and a state’s reputation as a reli-
able actor on the world stage may also come into play. Thus, for example, 
41. Database of ICSID Member States, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPS.,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited Oct. 
1, 2020). On the role of ICSID in general, see Julien Chaisse & Christian Bellak, Navigating 
the Expanding Universe of Investment Treaties—Creation and Use of Critical Index, 18 J.
INT’L ECON. 79 (2015). For the most recent economic trends in this space, see U.N. Conf. on 
Trade and Dev., Global Investment Trends Monitor No. 33, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/INF/2020/1 (Jan. 20, 2020).
42. See Bjorklund & Druzin, supra note 14, at 707 (arguing that institutional competi-
tion of ICSID from other regions of the world is constrained by network effects and lock-in).
43. ANDREAS KEMPER, VALUATION OF NETWORK EFFECTS IN SOFTWARE MARKETS:
A COMPLEX NETWORKS APPROACH 73–74 (2010).
44. The League of Nations (“LN”) never achieved a sufficiently robust level of net-
work lock-in for many reasons. For one, the LN never carved out a high enough level of mar-
ket consolidation given its institutional ambition—at its height, the LN boasted only 58 mem-
ber states. Member status also played a role in the LN’s failure (I revisit this in Part III).
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the United States may be said to possess higher status than, say, Liberia. But 
status may vary depending upon the nature of the organization in question. 
A state normally seen as wielding little international gravitas may possess a 
unique status in certain situations. For instance, Sri Lanka’s participation in 
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (“IOTC”) is more critical than that of 
the United States. simply because of Sri Lanka’s geographical location. 
Thus, with respect to the IOTC, Sri Lanka may be understood as possessing 
higher status than the U.S. Similarly, with respect to a multilateral environ-
mental agreement (“MEA”) addressing carbon dioxide emissions, Iran may 
be considered a higher-status state than the UK, France, Canada, or Austral-
ia, simply because Iran is a larger producer of CO2 emissions than any of 
the latter four countries, so its decision to participate or not to participate is 
of greater consequence given the aims of the treaty.
An international organization with high-status members is more likely 
to enjoy robust network lock-in for two reasons. The first is that a high-
status state will increase the value of an organization for all its members in a 
substantive sense—i.e., because of its economic clout, military power, etc. 
The second reason, however, is less obvious but arguably more crucial. 
There is an important signaling component to the participation of a high-
status state. Their participation can help shape ‘market’ expectations, signal-
ing to the international system that the organization boasts robust support. 
This helps shape perceptions regarding an organization’s stability, which in 
turn can “drive market outcomes such that they become self-fulfilling.”
45
This is similar to the concept of adaptive expectations described by Arthur 
and later taken up by North in which the increased prevalence of a technol-
ogy (or rule in the case of North) reduces uncertainty regarding its contin-
ued adoption and, thus, enhances belief of further prevalence.
46
In some cas-
es, member status may prove decisive. For instance the United States’
failure to join the LN undermined the League’s network effect pressure in 
terms of its substantive collective military power, but more crucially, it 
weakened its credibility. Because a collective security architecture like the 
LN turned so much on collective expectations, this signaling function may 
have been the stronger determinant in the LN’s eventual collapse. This sig-
naling component is fleshed out in greater detail in Part III.
45. Irina Suleymanova & Christian Wey, On the Role of Consumer Expectations in 
Markets with Network Effects (Düsseldorf Inst. for Competition Econ., Working Paper No. 13, 
2010). On self-fulfilling prophecies, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 115–18 (1978) (citing examples of expectations that “induce the kind of 
behavior that will cause the expectations to be fulfilled.”).
46. See W.B. Arthur, Self-Reinforcing Mechanisms in Economics, in THE ECONOMY AS 
AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 10, 10 (Philip Anderson eds., 1988); NORTH, supra note 21,
at 95; Positive Feedbacks, supra note 5, at 92; PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY, supra
note 5, at 112.
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D.  Coordination Benefits
A fourth variable that may indicate the degree of network lock-in that 
an organization is generating is what is known in the literature on standards 
as synchronization value.47 Synchronization value arises where agents re-
quire common standards in order to coordinate their interactions. Again, 
language is a good example: In order to communicate (synchronize), speak-
ers require common words with established meanings (common standards). 
Synchronization value may be distinguished from other kinds of network 
benefits that are not entirely tied to synchronization. For instance, NATO’s
primary network benefit is that it provides collective security to its mem-
bers. While this certainly requires high degrees of synchronization, syn-
chronization is not the principal benefit of NATO membership. This may be 
contrasted with the UPU. The UPU’s primary benefit is its synchronization 
value (establishing universal postal standards in order to coordinate postal 
delivery between its member states). Its institutional function is essentially 
to solve a coordination game between states, i.e., facilitating postal deliv-
ery.
48
Here multilateral intuitions are not only standards for coordination 
themselves, but they actually produce additional coordination standards.
While all organizations provide network benefits, synchronization does 
not always feature prominently. Synchronization differs among organiza-
tions. Organizations whose primary or sole benefit is the provision of syn-
chronization tend to be quite robust primarily because member states have 
little incentive to withdraw from them. Such institutions often resemble pure 
coordination games—i.e., driving on the left side of the road is just as good 
as driving on the right so long as everyone is in agreement. International or-
ganizations whose main benefit is establishing coordination standards typi-
cally produce powerful lock-in effects—the more crucial the need to coor-
dinate, the more intense the lock-in effect.
In sum, while precision is elusive, we can get a rough fix on an organi-
zation’s lock-in effect by considering these metrics. These indicators, how-
ever, have to be weighed against one another. Strength in one may compen-
sate for weakness in another. For instance, while the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) only comprises three states (a small network 
size), it is a very thick organization that involves a high-status state (the 
United States), and which offers significant economic benefits to its mem-
bers. Although it falls short in terms of network size, NAFTA’s lock-in ef-
fect is robust because it compensates for this in other areas.
49
47. For the concept of synchronization value, see S.J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E.
MARGOLIS, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy? 9 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 283, 295 (1996).
48. See The Universal Postal Union, General Regulations of the Universal Postal Union 
(2012).
49. Since first writing this, the Trump administration has renegotiated the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) (as the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement 
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In other cases, however, strength in one metric may be insufficient to 
compensate for weaknesses in another. For example, because of its high sta-
tus, the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement has 
sapped the agreement of substantial network effect pressure, weakening it as 
a framework for future environmental cooperation notwithstanding the im-
portance of the agreement’s network benefit, its large network size, and its 
considerable market consolidation.
50
Assessing the degree of lock-in that an 
organization is generating can be compared to assessing the strength of a 
tennis player. A player’s bad backhand and weak volley game may be offset 
by their strong serve, or it may not. However, where their backhand, volley 
game, serve, etc. are all strong, you can assume they are a strong player.
While an organization’s lock-in effect is difficult to assess when two 
organizations differ only slightly, it is not difficult to distinguish when this 
difference is extreme. Although it may be hard to quantify precisely, we 
can, for instance, confidently make the claim that the UN possesses a far 
greater degree of network lock-in than, for example, the International 
Commission on Missing Persons (“ICMP”). The ICMP is simply not com-
parable to the UN in any of the metrics discussed above. This kind of exer-
cise, however, must be taken for what it is—a rough approximation at 
best—and it is most meaningful when dealing with substantial differences 
between organizations.
IV. THE ART OF TREATY HACKING: STRATEGIES TO BOOST 
NETWORK LOCK-IN
The critical question is how we can use all of this to intensify the lock-
in effect of international organizations. This is the core of our discussion, 
for if we can do this, we can make these institutions more resistant to col-
lapse. With this goal in mind, this section offers a toolbox of sorts—six 
strategies policymakers may adopt to achieve this goal. These six strategies 
are as follows: (1) thickening, (2) status management, (3) network enlarge-
(“USMCA”)), initiated a formal withdrawal from the World Health Organization (“WHO”), 
and signaled that the United States will exit the UPU. This is a testament to the fact that net-
work effect pressure is no guarantee that states will not abandon an institution. It merely 
makes it less likely they will. It is typically the case that powerful countries, such as the Unit-
ed States, are less constrained by institutional lock-in.
50. Note that the United States is a high status state with respect to the Paris Agreement 
primarily because it is the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases. See Each Country’s
Share of CO2 Emissions, UCSUSA (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/each-
countrys-share-co2-emissions. That the Paris Agreement has not unraveled in the wake of the 
United States’ signaled withdrawal speaks to the agreement’s robust network effect pressure 
generated by its importance, massive network size, and near perfect market consolidation. But 
see Bryan Druzin, The Coming Collapse of the Paris Agreement, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. ONLINE
(Aug. 16, 2017), https://harvardjol.com/2017/08/16/the-coming-collapse-of-the-paris-climate-
agreement/ (arguing that multilateral environmental agreements are uniquely fragile because 
their value depends directly upon the number of states that are party to it and thus possess a 
certain ‘all or nothing’ quality to them).
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ment, (4) member stuffing, (5) forced incompatibility, and (6) increasing 
coordinating standards. While efficacy of each strategy will vary depending 
on the character of the organization in question, all these strategies may be 
applied to most international organizations to some degree. This is because 
all international organizations are composed of individual member states 
linked together, and so, on a basic structural level, are networks.
Networked markets demonstrate some peculiar structural characteris-
tics. They can, for instance, be extremely non-linear. Change might begin 
slowly and then suddenly accelerate with astonishing speed. Thresholds, 
critical mass, tipping points, bandwagoning, and collective expectations of-
ten feature prominently.
51
They are highly sensitive to minor perturbations 
that are then powerfully amplified in either direction, i.e., towards rapid ex-
pansion or rapid dissolution. Networked markets are also ‘hyper-selective.’
That is, because multiple equilibria are unable to co-exist for long periods, a 
single standard will, over time, tend to dominate, causing actors to coalesce 
around this single standard or institution.
52
Another feature of networked 
markets is that they tend to create zero-sum dynamics in which gain by one 
network can only come at a rival’s expense. Their most crucial feature, 
however, is that they generate positive externalities—as the network grows 
larger, it increases in value for each of its users. All of the treaty-hacking 
strategies outlined below are designed to exploit these unique structural dy-
namics and should be understood in this context. The strength of these strat-
egies is that none of them require any formal amendment to the constituent 
treaty of an organization. They operate entirely on the basic structural level 
of the organization rather than with respect to its legal framework.
53
A. Thickening
The first of these strategies, thickening, entails increasing the number of 
benefits member states derive from an organization by expanding the num-
ber of issue areas covered by the institution. The more numerous the bene-
fits, the greater the relative cost of exiting the network and thus the stronger 
the lock-in effect. On one level this strategy may seem obvious: If you want 
51. For the important concepts of critical mass and tipping, see SCHELLING, supra note 
45, at 98–99, 101–10. The idea of ‘tipping points’ was first developed by Morton Grodzins. 
Morton Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, 197 SCI. AM., Oct. 1957, at 33–47. This is relat-
ed to the concept of ‘phase transition’ in physics and the study of complex systems.
52. TIM WEITZEL, ECONOMICS OF STANDARDS IN INFORMATION NETWORKS 24
(2004); see also RUDI BEKKERS, MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS: GSM, UMTS,
TETRA, AND ERMES 196 (2001) (Discussing self-standardization with respect to telecommuni-
cations). For the application of self-standardization induced by network effect pressures to the 
formation of legal order, see Bryan Druzin, Towards a Theory of Spontaneous Legal Stand-
ardization, 8 J. INT’L DIS. SETTLEMENT 403 (2016) (arguing that transnational legal norms 
evolve as a consequence of network effect pressures and increased interconnectivity).
53. The one exception here, depending on the organization in question, may be the 
strategy of forced incompatibility.
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to keep states in an organization, increase the benefits they get from it. 
However, where network effects are at play, this takes on a different charac-
ter: Thickening will exert a uniquely powerful impact because even the 
slightest increase in benefit is immediately and evenly distributed to every 
actor within the network. For instance, if a cell phone carrier improves its 
coverage, every customer of the cell phone carrier immediately receives that 
benefit. If a new person learns a language, every single speaker of that lan-
guage instantly benefits (because they have an additional speaker with 
whom they can potentially communicate). If a small city repaves its network 
of roads, all of the city’s drivers will benefit (assuming they all equally use 
the road system). If one person in a small community is vaccinated for a 
highly contagious virus, all of the people in that network instantly benefit 
because their odds of contracting that virus decrease.
This ‘equality of benefit’ is not guaranteed in the case of organizational 
structures that do not generate strong network effects. Take, for example, a 
company that has a windfall of additional revenue, which it decides to dis-
tribute in the form of salary increases. This is an excludable, rivalrous good 
(i.e., it can be distributed unequally and consumption by one consumer pre-
vents simultaneous consumption by other consumers). If the company de-
cides to give the entire additional revenue to its CEO as a giant bonus, this 
will not increase the organization’s lock-in effect.
54
Where network effects 
are present, however, this is not possible: Every user of the network imme-
diately shares in the benefit.
55
The benefit is largely non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous. This is a core difference: This renders organizations that pro-
duce network effects more responsive to thickening because they more ef-
fectively lock in all of their member states equally.
56
54. Indeed, in the case of many organizations, intra-organizational politics, rent-
seeking, or just the basic structure of an organization (e.g. top-down vs. decentralized), often 
cause benefits to be allocated unequally to its members.
55. This is not to say that, in the case of organizations that generate network effects, 
every benefit must be distributed equally merely that, unlike the example of the CEO bonus, 
there will always be at least some degree of additional distribution because of the inherently 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous nature of network-effect generated benefits. For instance, 
some of the examples cited above (namely the road paving and vaccination examples) may 
also involve a certain unequal distribution of benefit in addition to the benefit gleaned by each 
network member: Some drivers may own Ferraris that benefit more from smoothly repaved 
roads, and particularly vulnerable demographics, such as the elderly and immunocompro-
mised, may benefit more from suppressing a virus’s transmissibility within a community. The 
point here is simply that, unlike with the example of the CEO bonus, network effects guaran-
tee that there will always be some degree of ‘benefit spillover.’
56. The idea of thickening should not be confused with, for example, the idea of spillo-
ver in the neofunctionalist theory of regional integration (or the concept of complex interde-
pendence in international relations theory), which is superficially similar. This is because 
thickening has a unique impact where network effects are at play. On the idea of spill-over, 
see ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES,
1950-1957 (1958). For the foundational work on complex interdependence, see ROBERT 
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A great example of thickening (as a deliberate strategy or not) is the 
UN’s incremental expansion through the creation of new agencies or the in-
corporation of existing organizations as specialized agencies into the UN 
System. In the case of the UN, thickening has occurred gradually over three-
quarters of a century. Specialized agencies, such as the World Bank Group 
(“WBG”) established in 1944, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) es-
tablished in 1948, the International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”)
formed in 1957, the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) es-
tablished in 1967, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (“UNIDO”) founded (as a specialized agency) in 1985, intensified the 
UN’s lock-in effect by multiplying the benefits of UN membership while 
raising the costs of remaining outside of the UN system. Although not every 
UN member directly participates in its many sub-agencies, the UN system 
as a whole is indirectly strengthened as its web of intra-institutional ar-
rangements grows—that is, as the UN system thickens.
57
This expansion 
progressively increased the UN’s lock-in effect. Today the UN system gen-
erates massive network effect pressures and, as a result, exerts an intense 
lock-in effect. Any nation wishing to withdraw from its institutional ar-
rangement would face a heavy cost in doing so. The UN system is fairly ro-
bust as a consequence.
Figure 2.  The figure below shows the gradual ‘thickening’ of the UN 
since its inception. It shows the total annual number of the UN’s secretariat 
offices and departments and its major programs and specialized agencies (as 
well as related sub-organizations) added to the UN’s six principal organs in 
each year. The UN system grew more than fourfold between 1945 and 
2020.
58
KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 
(1977).
57. A situation in which an actor gains benefit indirectly from network growth is 
known in the literature as an indirect network effect. For example, every new Tesla owner in 
Oslo creates the impetus to build more charging stations in the city, which then indirectly 
benefits every other Tesla owner in the Oslo area. For a more expansive explanation of the 
distinction between direct and indirect network effects, see Buying Commercial Law, supra
note 21, at 149–53; Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 424; see also Lemley & McGowan, su-
pra note 21, at 488–94 (distinguishing between what they term ‘actual networks’ and ‘virtual 
networks’).
58. Note that this is not an exhaustive list.  Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies, 
and Others, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-
specialized-agencies-and-others/index.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2020).
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Figure 2
As an organization thickens, member states become progressively more 
committed to the institution because the relative price of leaving it grows 
higher with each new benefit created. John Ikenberry notes this lock-in ef-
fect (although he is referring to institutions à la North),: as “more of their 
activities are hooked into the institution and its operations. . .[agents] have a 
stake—or a vested interest—in the continuation of the institution.”
59
The re-
sult is that the “costs of disruption or change in the institutions grow over 
time.”
60
Thus, as benefits proliferate, it becomes more difficult for states to 
reduce or abandon their commitments to the organization.
The evolution of the EU from a rudimentary customs union, focused 
simply on issues of industrial production, to an organizational arrangement 
of ever-increasing economic, legal, and political complexity is another ex-
cellent example of thickening.
Figure 3. The figure below shows the rapid growth of the agencies of 
the eu (decentralized bodies that targeta broad range of specific issue areas 
from intellectual property to aviation safety). Note that the chart includes 
two proposed agencies for 2020 and 2021 respectively: the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (“EPPO”) and the European Union Agency for the 
Space Programme (“EUSPA”).
61
59. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND
THE REBUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 70 (Princeton Univ. Press new ed. 2019).
60. Id.
61. Agencies and Other EU Bodies, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/23uropean-
union/about-eu/agencies_en (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
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Figure 3
Although the overall institutional strength of the European project re-
mains the subject of perennial speculation, what is certain is that the broad-
ening of the union and the deepening of its political, cultural, and economic 
ties has made the EU more cohesive than it would have otherwise been. 
This is not, however, to suggest that thickening renders exit from a network 
impossible. Clearly, the case of Brexit demonstrates otherwise. However, 
the fact that the U.K.’s withdrawal from the EU is the cause of such enor-
mous economic and socio-political upheaval illustrates the binding effect of 
thickening. Had the U.K. joined the European Economic Community 
(“EEC”) in 1958 and left it a few years later, it would have hardly registered 
as an event of such historic import as the U.K. leaving the EU in 2020. 
Likewise, if the EU project continues for another sixty years, the ability of 
the U.K. to successfully decouple itself from the union would have, un-
doubtedly, only further diminished.
62
It is not always realistic—indeed it is sometimes impossible—to aug-
ment the benefit actors glean from an organization. However, it is usually 
possible to increase the number of benefits on offer by broadening the range 
of issue areas the organization addresses. While the approach conforms bet-
62. The fact that Brexit was decided through a popular referendum directly by British 
voters (the vast majority of whom were likely unfamiliar with the multifaceted and fine-
grained nuances of the network benefits provided by EU membership) also cannot be over-
looked. Had the question been left to policymakers and technocrats, it would have been, I 
submit, exceedingly unlikely that the decision would have favored leaving the EU. A plebi-
scite uniquely allows for influences unrelated to a rational and unified assessment of network 
benefit, such as economic anxieties, nationalist fervor, and populist sentiment, to enter the 
conversation and hold sway. The treaty-hacking strategies put forward here assume a model in 
which an institution’s network benefit is clearly assessed so that nations can act on their stra-
tegic interests. The influence of popular opinion over national policies may at times subvert 
this process.
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ter to some international organizations than others, it can be applied to most 
organizations to some degree.
B. Status Management
A second strategy policymakers may employ to strengthen network 
lock-in involves curating an organization’s member states vis-à-vis their sta-
tus. This strategy is uniquely effective in the case of network effect markets 
because such markets are particularly prone to tipping and sudden band-
wagons.
63
International organizations are highly vulnerable to bandwagon-
ing behavior because the value of an organization for each of its member 
states depends on the participation of other member states. The exit of a 
member state from an organization instantly reduces the organization’s val-
ue for all of its remaining members, which may in turn cause others to fol-
low suit in a self-reinforcing manner, creating a ‘jumping ship’ effect and 
sparking a death spiral towards collapse.
64
The choices of high-status states 
are thus especially consequential because their impact in this regard is far
greater than low-status states.
This operates in two dimensions. The first is in terms of the substantive 
benefits that high-status states bring to an organization. The second is the 
effect they have on collective perceptions. The latter is, in fact, often the 
more important of the two because, while the substantive impact of high-
status states is not always clear or possible to quantify correctly, perceptions 
are constantly at work whether they are accurate or not. Thus, in network 
effect markets, perceptions matter.
65
The loss of a high-status member can 
shatter collective confidence in an organization, triggering a dynamic of 
self-confirming expectations. To use Thomas Schelling’s bank-run example: 
If people believe that a bank is on the verge of insolvency, they will hurry to 
withdraw their money, creating the very insolvency they fear.
66
Indeed, it 
might be the case that the greater threat to the EU posed by Brexit is not the 
material loss the U.K.’s exit represents to the EU, but rather its effect on 
collective perceptions regarding the EU’s stability going forward.
67
63. ‘Tipping’ occurs when a system lurches to a new equilibrium in a sudden and punc-
tuated fashion. For the concept of tipping, see SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 92–94, 98–99.
64. I have written elsewhere on the impact of collective expectations on treaty stability, 
specifically in the case of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (“MEAs”). See Bryan 
Druzin, The Parched Earth of Cooperation: How to Solve the Tragedy of the Commons in 
International Environmental Governance, 27 DUKE  J. COMPAR. & INT’L L. 73, 96 (2016). I 
draw from that article here.
65. See generally Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Compe-
tition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 1967, 2021–27 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007).
66. I am paraphrasing Schelling here. See SCHELLING, supra note 45, at 117.
67. Brexit, however, has arguably demonstrated the overall robustness of the EU’s
network effect pressure. When the U.K. voted to leave the EU many feared it marked the be-
ginning of its demise. Analysts predicted that the U.K.’s exit was “the first in a series of dom-
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Organizations that require collective action or are threatened by free-
riding, such as MEAs, are particularly sensitive to the participation of high-
status states.  For instance, the United States’ failure to ratify the Kyoto Pro-
tocol impaired the treaty’s cohesion: It arguably caused Canada to later 
withdraw, which effectively crippled the treaty. Notably, the United States’
withdrawal was itself a response to perceived free-riding by high-status pol-
luters such as China and India. Although it did not formally collapse, the 
Kyoto Protocol was so weakened that the international community was 
forced to negotiate the Paris Agreement in 2015.
68
However, the United 
States’ signaled withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 profoundly 
weakened the agreement and may prove to be fatal. In the wake of the loss 
of such a high-status state, the perception that other states’ commitment to 
the agreement might now also be flagging may enervate compliance, be-
coming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as states adapt their “actions in light of 
our expectations about the actions of others.”
69
This is often the case with 
international organizations that produce a public good and so possess an all-
or-none flavor. If, however, instead of the United States, Kenya withdrew 
from the Paris Agreement, it would hardly raise a stir. After all, it is but one 
country of 195. The United States, however, is an extremely high-status 
player (chiefly because it is the world’s second greatest producer of carbon 
emissions), thus its impending exit has undercut the agreement and thrown 
its viability into question.
Collective security organizations are also excellent examples of public 
goods problems. They are highly sensitive to free-riding and can thus col-
lapse as a result of changes in collective expectations. The failure of the LN 
is perhaps the paradigmatic example. While the organization achieved a 
healthy degree of market consolidation (at its greatest extent, between 1934 
and 1935, it comprised fifty-eight countries of a seventy-seven-country sys-
tem), the LN was profoundly fragile.
70
Key high-status powers never joined 
the LN (namely the United States) or did not sufficiently overlap in their pe-
riods of membership, which undermined the LN’s credibility. It did not take 
much to shatter the organization’s cohesion. The withdrawal of two high-
status states in 1933—Japan and Germany—sent the LN into a tailspin and 
inoes to fall and spoke of a possible “Frexit,” “Nexit” and “Swexit.” Frank Langfitt, Here’s
Why Brexit Wasn’t Followed by Frexit, Swexit, or Nexit, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Apr 26, 2019, 
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/26/715926169/heres-why-brexit-wasnt-followed-by-frexit-
swexit-or-nexit. This, however, never materialized. Battered by Brexit, a global pandemic, 
and strong economic headwinds, the EU remains very much intact. See also infra note 105 
and accompanying text.
68. See Robert C. Stowe, Differentiation, Financial Support, and the Paris Climate 
Talks, HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFS.: ANALYSIS & OPS.
(Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/differentiation-financial-support-
and-paris-climate-talks.
69. Increasing Returns, supra note 21, at 254.
70. See ANIQUE H.M. VAN GINNEKEN, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS 217–18 (2006).
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hurled it towards collapse.
71
Japan and Germany were especially high-status 
members because they were belligerent states. Their exit weakened the 
LN’s collective strength. However, more crucially, as aggressive states 
standing outside of the League and thus representing potential military chal-
lenges to the organization, their withdrawal eroded member states’ confi-
dence in the LN’s ability to maintain its cohesion in the face of potential ag-
gression. As a result, their exit sparked a cascade of withdrawals that crip-
crippled the LN’s ability to function. Most of these fleeing countries were 
not militarily significant.
72
However, their exit undermined collective confi-
dence in the organization—the damage was done on the level of collective 
perceptions and expectations.
Figure 4. The figure below shows the gradual collapse of the ln begin-
ning soon after japan and germany’s withdrawal. the ln was finally dis-




After failing to adequately confront aggression in 1935 and 1936, by 
1937, the LN could not muster any meaningful international support to op-
pose the full-scale Japanese invasion of China. The LN simply lacked credi-
bility. Agreements without third-party coercion only have as much power as 
the parties to the agreement believe they do—no more and no less. By 1937, 
no one believed the LN still had collective support; it therefore did not have 
collective support. The LN then limped along, weakened and ineffectual, 
71. Id.
72. Member states withdrew in the following order by year (note that countries an-
nexed by the Axis powers are omitted from this list): Paraguay (1935); Guatemala (1936); 
Honduras (1936); Nicaragua (1936); El Salvador (1937); Italy (1937); Chile (1938); Venezue-
la (1938); Peru (1939); Thailand (1939); Spain (1939); Hungary (1939); Haiti (1942).  See Id.
73. Id.
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until its official dissolution in 1946. The LN’s collapse illustrates in dra-
matic fashion the significance of high-status states in maintaining an inter-
national organization’s cohesion.
The collapse of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (“SEATO”), al-
so a collective security organization, is another (albeit less consequential) 
example. Formed in 1954 to counter the expansion of communism in South 
East Asia, it comprised eight states: the United States, France, the U.K., 
New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan. Pakistan 
exited SEATO in 1968 (formally in 1973) and France suspended all support 
in 1975 (although it did not formally leave).
74
With the alliance’s cohesion 
seriously weakened, the ceasing of hostilities in Vietnam was sufficient to 
cause an already fragile SEATO to completely unravel by 1977.
75
SEATO 
illustrates how states can have high-status simply because a network is 
small. In this case, Pakistan’s participation proved significant because it was 
one of only eight member states.




While the loss of a high-status state can spark a death spiral towards 
collapse, the participation of high-status states may strengthen an organiza-
tion. The inclusion of these states triggers a positive bandwagon in which 
74. RICHARD J. SAMUELS, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 662, 662 (2005).
75. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 1954,, STATE DEP’T: OFF. OF THE 
HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/seato (last visited Feb. 18, 2020).
76. DAMIEN FENTON, TO CAGE THE RED DRAGON: SEATO AND THE DEFENCE OF 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 1955–1965 230–49 (2012).
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states, perceiving the institution as having grown more robust, join or, if 
they are already members, cling even tighter to the organization. Either 
way—positive or negative—high-status members boast an outsized impact. 
Policymakers can shape the collective expectations surrounding an organi-
zation by strategically acquiring or maintaining these actors as members. 
This may prove particularly effective in situations of institutional competi-
tion in which actors must choose between organizations. In such situations, 
as in any game with multiple equilibria, curating public perceptions is often 
decisive in ‘tipping’ a market.
77
A good example of market tipping is the institutional rivalry between 
the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) and the European Econom-
ic Community (“EEC”). During the 1960s, EFTA and the EEC (which 
would eventually evolve into the EU) were the two dominant trade blocs of 
Western Europe.
78
Seven states, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Swe-
den, Switzerland and the U.K. (later joined by Finland, Iceland and Liech-
tenstein), made up EFTA while six other European states, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg, comprised the 
EEC. In 1973 the U.K., a high-status state, withdrew from EFTA and joined 
the EEC. This caused the market to tip. It sparked an exodus from EFTA 
and a subsequent strengthening of the EEC.
79
EFTA represented a block of 
holdout economies that was impeding larger European integration, the most 
significant among these being the U.K.
80
The U.K.’s jump to the EEC di-
minished the economic importance of this block of ‘holdouts’ while simul-
taneously increasing the economic power of the EEC. This allowed the EEC 
to gain a critical mass that secured its eventual dominance over its dimin-
ished institutional competitor. While not the sole cause of the EEC’s tri-
umph over EFTA, the U.K.’s defection from EFTA to the EEC in 1973 
played a pivotal role.
77. William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 952, 960 (Boudwijn Bouckaert, & Gerrit DeGeest eds., 2000).
78. The European Economic Community (“EEC”) and the European Free Trade Asso-
ciation (“EFTA”) represented two competing visions of European economic cooperation. Un-
like the EEC, EFTA was never designed for European integration—EFTA offered an alterna-
tive model, seeing the path for European economic cooperation as a free trade zone rather than 
as a customs union that would require states to trade in sovereignty for market access to the 
broader European market.
79. Because their economies were so interlinked, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway ap-
plied together with the U.K., seeing it as necessary to also join the EEC if the U.K. did (Nor-
way ended up rejecting EU membership in a 1994 referendum). See ALLAN F. TATHAM,
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 7 (2009).
80. This was because the U.K. was the economic powerhouse of EFTA with by far the 
largest economy. In 1970, the nominal Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) (in current US Dol-
lars these seven EFTA states were: Portugal ($8.1 billion), Norway ($12.8 billion), Austria 
($15.3 billion), Denmark ($17 billion), Switzerland ($24.2 billion), Sweden ($38 billion), and 
the UK ($130.6 billion). See GDP (Current US$) (1960-1970), THE WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=1970&start=1960 (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2020).
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Figure 6. The figure below shows the expansion of the EU (including 
all of its earlier institutional predecessors) and the institutional decline of 
efta in terms of number of member states. while there were many factors at
play, the U.K.’s exit from efta and subsequent ascension to the EEC was a
key tipping point in substantive terms (i.e., the economic significance of the 
U.K. economy) as well in terms of collective expectations.
81
Figure 6
In cases that involve a critical mass dynamic—as was the case with 
EFTA and the EU—the behavior of high-status states may be a matter of 
life or death for an organization. International organizations often exhibit a 
point at which a threshold is passed and the system suddenly ‘tips’ with 
states either flocking into the organization or abandoning it en masse.82 Mul-
tiple conflicting institutions cannot coexist indefinitely. Competing institu-
tions can persist for some time, but if there is sufficient interconnection and 
81. EFTA Through the Years, EUR. FREE TRADE ASS’N, https://www.efta.int/About-
EFTA/EFTA-through-years-747 (last visited Feb 20, 2020); The History of the European Un-
ion, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en (last visited Feb 20, 
2020).
82. For the application of tipping and thresholds to treaties, see SCOTT BARRETT,
ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING:
THE STRATEGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 254–68 (2003) (arguing that there is a 
threshold minimum participation level to multilateral treaties that, once reached, shifts the 
underlying game structure so that it pays for all non-participating states to suddenly partici-
pate). High-status states can help a treaty reach this critical mass threshold at which remaining 
non-member states will flock to the organization.
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the ability for agents to switch, the market will eventually tip decisively in 
the direction of one institution over its rival or rivals.
83
C. Network Enlargement
The third strategy policymakers may employ to intensify an organiza-
tion’s lock-in effect, network enlargement, is increasing an organization’s
number of member states. Although there are exceptions, the benefits pro-
vided by an organization with strong network effects grow as its network 
grows. This is not always the case with other forms of organization. While 
languages increase in value as numbers grow, lifeboats, for example, do not. 
In the case of some organizations, expansion will produce both benefits and 
disadvantages (e.g., expanding NATO will produce greater collective hard 
power but there is the downside of having to commit to the defense of an 
additional country and all of the potential pitfalls that come with that).
84
In 
other cases, however, the benefit that flows from enlargement just keeps on 
increasing as the network grows without any substantial downside.
85
Organ-
izations that exhibit network effects are uniquely receptive to network en-
largement because so much of their value flows directly from their network 
size—the bigger the network, the bigger its benefit. In international organi-
zations with strong network effects, network enlargement is therefore an ex-
tremely effective way to increase an organization’s benefits and thus inten-
sify its lock-in effect.
86
The EU is a case study in network enlargement. As the EU grew from 
six members in the early 1970s to fifteen in the 1990s, and then to twenty-
eight states (now twenty-seven), so too did its economic significance and, 
thus, its lock-in effect.
Figure 7. The chart below shows the aggregate nominal gross domestic 
product (“GDP”) of the EU (This includes the EU’s institutional precursors, 
the EEC and the EC) and the EU’s founding member states’ combined 
83. David Dranove & Neil Gandal, Surviving a Standards War: Lessons Learned from 
the Life and Death of DIVX, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1, 
1–14 (Kerem Tomak ed., 2005).
84. In the case of NATO’s expansion since the end of the Cold War, there was no sig-
nificant downside to network enlargement as any viable military threat was minimal. Hence, 
the decision to expand was made much easier than it was during the Cold War.
85. The positive externalities of NATO’s enlargement are discussed in the section that 
immediately follows with respect to the strategy of member stuffing.
86. There is empirical support for the contention that a larger more heterogeneous 
membership is associated with greater organizational survivability. For work supporting this 
claim, see Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Death of International Organizations. The Organiza-
tional Ecology of Intergovernmental Organizations, 1815–2015, REV. INT’L ORGS. (2018)
(employing a dataset coding detailed information on all IGOs created since 1815 to analyze 
why many collapse).
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GDP. GDP is used here from among the many possible indicators of net-
work lock-in as economic benefit is central to the EU.
87
Figure 7
Organizations whose primary benefit to their members is that they facil-
itate coordination will be particularly responsive to this approach because an 
increase in network size allows states to coordinate with a larger number of 
other states. This is captured in our example of language: The more people 
who speak a language, the more useful it becomes because there are more 
speakers with whom one can communicate.
88
However, any organization 
whose benefits increase as its membership grows will be receptive to this 
strategy.
Network enlargement may also advantage an organization because it 
impedes institutional competition. The society of nations is a finite system 
with a limited number of state actors (only 195).
89
This creates a zero-sum 
87. GDP (current US$) – European Union (1960-present), THE WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2018&locations=EU&start=19
60 (last visited Feb 20, 2020). Note that this is in 2019 US dollars. Also, Germany is not in-
cluded until 1970 (as data on pre-1970 West Germany is unreliable).
88. This assumes an agent is not limited in those with whom she wishes to communi-
cate.
89. This figure is based upon the US Department of State’s count of independent states. 
See Independent States in the World, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov
/independent-states-in-the-world/ (last visited Feb 20, 2020). Counts vary, however, depend-
ing on classification and politics. The UN, for instance, recognizes 193 states in the interna-
tional system with two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine). If the 
count is extended to include political entities with partial recognition from the UN (i.e. Tai-
wan, Western Sahara, Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Northern Cyprus) the total num-
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game in most cases: As an organization’s market share increases, by defini-
tion, fewer non-member states remain in the system. This shrinks the pool 
of potential members available to a rival organization and exacerbates the 
start-up problem discussed earlier.
90
If non-member states represent a mi-
nority, it will be difficult for a new organization to challenge an incumbent 
organization to which the majority of the international system belongs.
91
If 
the incumbent enjoys total market share, short of some powerful exogenous 
shock, it will be extremely difficult for an upstart organization to gain trac-
tion. States are locked into the incumbent both by the benefit it provides and 
the potential loss of that benefit should a state abandon the dominant organ-
ization and switch to the replacement.
When weighing the effectiveness of network enlargement, one im-
portant consideration is how much of the market remains to be consolidated. 
For example, expanding WTO membership from its current count of 164 
states will not dramatically intensify the WTO’s lock-in effect simply be-
cause there are not many states left in the international system to join. Net-
work expansion was far more crucial in 1947 for WTO’s institutional pre-
cursor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), which was 
established with only twenty-three member states,
92
than it is today for the 
WTO, which comprises the majority of states in the international system 
(and every significant national economy).
93
Figure 8. The figure below shows the nine trade rounds of the 
GATT/WTO by number of member states. the chart shows that network en-
largement was a useful strategy throughout most of the GATT’s evolution 
since WWII but that the usefulness of network enlargement disappeared by 
the early 2000s (simply because the trade organization had succeeded in 
consolidating the 195-state market).
94
ber is 201. See Member States, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/member-states/ (last visited Oct. 
4, 2020).
90. Institutional rivalry will likely arise wherever there is substantial similarity between 
two or more international organizations in terms of their primary objectives and purpose. 
Their specific form and function, however, need not be wholly identical for rivalry to take 
root. For instance, while the Warsaw Pact and NATO differed considerably in many respects, 
because their primary objectives were the same (and because they dealt with an issue of such 
import), intense institutional rivalry emerged.
91. I have discussed the start-up problem in relation to international institutions, specif-
ically ICSID, elsewhere. See, e.g., Bjorklund & Druzin, supra note 14, at 707.
92. Understanding the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/English
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited Feb 20, 2020).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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Figure 8
The strategy of network enlargement should also be applied judiciously. 
This is because in some instances, over-expansion may undermine an organ-
ization’s stability. For instance (to take an exaggerated example), if the EU 
were to suddenly fling open membership to all fifty-four African states, this 
would certainly weaken the EU (indeed, it would likely lead to its collapse). 
The mind reels at the variables involved: political and economic forces, cul-
tural heterogeneity, security considerations, etc. In such scenarios, network 
enlargement will strengthen an organization but start yielding diminishing 
returns beyond a certain threshold, rendering network enlargement a very 
effective strategy but only to a specific level of expansion.
95
With respect to most organizations, however, network expansion will 
be continually beneficial. This is particularly the case, for instance, where 
free-riding is a problem, such as with MEAs or environmental organizations 
that address public goods and require significant upfront sacrifice. Non-
member states free-riding off of member states’ efforts may destabilize an 
MEA. As their membership increases, however, MEAs strengthen because 
95. This is, at least partially, why the EU’s enlargement policy is so stringent. The key 
criteria for accession to the EU (the ‘Copenhagen criteria’) are having “stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of mi-
norities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market 
forces in the EU; the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of member-
ship, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” Candidates, 
however, must also adopt and implement all of the current EU rules, which are “divided into 
35 different policy fields (chapters), such as transport, energy, environment, etc., each of 
which is negotiated separately.” See European Neighborhood Policy And Enlargement 
Negotiations, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy
/conditions-membership_en.
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the pool of free-riding states shrinks commensurate with the network’s en-
largement. For instance, the network effect pressure of the Global Environ-
ment Facility (“GEF”), which boasts a sizeable market share of 183 member 
states,
96
would only increase if the remaining states in the international sys-
tem (who are currently free-riding) joined the fund.
Network enlargement, however, may not always be feasible—
particularly when the organization is already faltering (it is difficult to at-
tract new investors to a failing business). As a practical matter, therefore, it 
may be more prudent for policymakers to pursue this strategy while an or-
ganization is viewed as stable. Moreover, policymakers may need to consid-
er variables such as when to expand, the rate of expansion, and which states 
to target as members (e.g., high-status states). Depending upon the organiza-
tion in question, these variables may prove pivotal. While network enlarge-
ment will not translate into an increase in network lock-in in each and every 
case, as a general rule, the larger the network’s size, the reliably more robust 
the organization’s network effect pressure will be.
D. Member Stuffing
The fourth strategy is really a subset of network enlargement. It is a 
kind of targeted network enlargement in which relatively minor states are 
brought into the organization that, once incorporated, are more likely to be-
come steadfast members because they are less important players. This can 
be a very effective strategy for the same reason thickening is effective—
network effect benefits are evenly distributed to all users of the network re-
gardless of individual input. (Recall the example of language: With each 
new person that learns a language, every speaker of that language instantly 
benefits.) This equality of benefit creates a dynamic in which minor states 
derive benefit from membership disproportionate to their contribution and 
this has the effect of deeply locking them into the organization.
Montenegro, for example, is a very enthusiastic member of NATO and 
is unlikely to leave the security organization. Likewise, it is highly unlikely 
that Latvia will exit the EU any time soon. This is because both Montenegro 
and Latvia derive far more benefit than they contribute.
97
A large influx of 
minor members will thus increase the average lock-in effect for an organiza-
96. See Organization, GLOB. ENV’T FACILITY, https://www.thegef.org/about
/organization (last visited Oct. 12, 2020).
97. In the case of NATO, for instance, Montenegro’s 2019 total military spending was 
$89.3 million (constant (2018) US Dollars). See SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH. CTR., https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. The total mili-
tary spending of NATO, the defensive umbrella to which Montenegro, as a NATO member, 
has complete access, was over 1 trillion US$ in 2019. See NAN TIAN, ALEXANDRA KUIMOVA,
DIEGO LOPES DA SILVA, PIETER D. WEZEMAN & SIEMON T. WEZEMAN, TRENDS IN WORLD 
MILITARY EXPENDITURE, 2019 4 (2020).
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tion.
98
International organizations can exploit this dynamic and adopt a 
strategy of member stuffing to intensify the institution’s lock-in effect. In-
tentionally or not, this is precisely what both NATO and the EU did and it 
greatly strengthened their organizational cohesion.
Consider the case of NATO. At the end of the Cold War many member 
states were questioning the purpose of NATO given that its chief strategic 
adversary, the Soviet Union, no longer existed. What was NATO’s re-
sponse? NATO responded with rapid network enlargement.
Figure 9. The figure below shows NATO’s network enlargement since 




98. Crucially, the addition of these states will not create a free-rider problem where 
network effects are involved because network effects generate positive externalities—i.e., the 
addition of Montenegro to NATO only increases the aggregate deterrence effect of NATO for 
all of its member states. As already discussed, while there may be disadvantages to over-
expansion—e.g., over-expanding NATO may have negative geopolitical repercussions—this 
is unrelated to the network benefit itself. In the case of the network benefit, network enlarge-
ment will just generate added value. This is the unique nature of positive externalities—bigger 
is almost always better.
99. NATO Status Lists, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,  https://www.state.gov/north-atlantic-
treaty (last visited Feb 12, 2020).
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This was a simple strategy that did not require any amendment to 
NATO’s constituent treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty, and it was extremely 
effective. As an organization, NATO successfully weathered this period of 
uncertainty, justifying its continued existence by reinventing itself as a secu-
rity organization overseeing an assortment of humanitarian assistance and 
security activities stretching beyond the borders of Europe.
100
All of the 
states that joined NATO after the Cold War were minor states and thus 
highly invested in the survival of the organization.
101
This helped strengthen 
NATO during this period of existential uncertainty. These states are intense-
ly locked into the security agreement because they get far more than they 
give—while their contribution is relatively small they reap the entire securi-
ty benefit of NATO.
The EU has also engaged in member stuffing. EU member states who 
are relatively minor contributors to the EU but who reap many of the eco-
nomic union’s institutional benefits are the most deeply locked in because 
the EU offers so much relative value. As in the case of NATO’s expansion, 
the EU’s rapid enlargement in the 2000s, which consisted of relatively mi-
nor national economies, helped strengthen the union by bringing in a raft of 
states deeply committed to the European project.
102
Figure 10. The figure below shows the enlargement of the EU. Note 
the sudden jump in the 2000s.
103
100. This was quite an accomplishment considering a 2010 study by the Brookings Insti-
tution concludes that approximately two-thirds of all collective security alliances in history 
“have dissolved due to the elimination of its principal threat (or being vanquished by it).” See 
COLONEL PATRICK T. WARREN, ALLIANCE HISTORY AND THE FUTURE NATO: WHAT THE 
LAST 500 YEARS OF ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR TELLS US ABOUT NATO’S PATH FORWARD 5
(2010).
101. By chronological order of accession, these states are: Czechia, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Albania, Montenegro. See A Short History of 
NATO, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_
139339.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
102. By chronological order of accession, these member states were: Cyprus (2004), the 
Czech Republic (2004), Estonia (2004), Hungary (2004), Latvia (2004), Lithuania (2004), 
Malta (2004), Poland (2004), Slovakia (2004), Slovenia (2004), Bulgaria (2007), Romania 
(2007), Croatia (2013). Again, a careful balance had to be struck between intensifying net-
work lock-in through member stuffing and the potential destabilizing effects of overexpan-
sion. See The History of the European Union, supra note 81.
103. Data from: The History of the European Union, supra note 81.
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Figure 10
In 2016, there was widespread fear in European policy circles that, be-
cause of the U.K.’s high status, Brexit would ignite a contagion effect that 
would cause other member states likewise to withdraw from the union. 
There was talk of a Frexit (France), Nexit (the Netherlands), Italeave (Italy), 
and so on.
104
This secessionist contagion, however, did not occur. Yet, this 
might have been otherwise if the EU had not swelled its ranks in the 2000s, 
which likely boosted the union’s lock-in effect.  Both NATO’s rapid expan-
sion in the 1990s and the EU’s in the 2000s illustrate how member stuff-
ing—intentional or not—can intensify an organization’s overall lock-in ef-
fect by absorbing minor states that are structurally more locked into the 
institution and thus less likely to exit.
E. Forced Incompatibility
The fifth strategy policymakers may employ to intensify lock-in relates 
to a concept called multi-homing. Multi-homing occurs when users in a 
networked system adopt two or more services at the same time. For exam-
ple, merchants who use incompatible credit card payment systems such as 
Visa and MasterCard are multi-homing.
105
Apple allowing users to switch 
between operating systems on its computers is another example of multi-
homing. The ability to multi-home is significant because it frees actors from 
having to choose between competing networks. Released from this con-
straint, actors face little to no cost in switching to another network. This 
104. See Chico Harlan, Frexit? Italeave? After Watching Brexit, Other European Coun-
tries Say: No, Thanks, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/europe/frexit-italeave-after-watching-brexit-other-european-countries-say-no-thanks/2019
/03/29/7b6e059a-4be0-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html.
105. See Farrell & Kemperer, supra note 65, at 2009, 2032, 2051.
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ease of adoption weakens the lock-in effect, allowing a new service or 
product to gain a foothold in the market where users would otherwise be 
locked into the incumbent standard.
In situations where an organization is facing institutional competition, 
prohibiting multi-homing can help lock in members. This is a highly effec-
tive strategy in network effect markets because they are winner-take-all 
markets. That is, they are hyper-selective, meaning one standard will usual-
ly dominate the entire market. This strategy is effective because it not only 
locks users in, buttressing your network, but in doing so, it denies your 
competition access to your users, thus impeding their network growth.
106
This is a common business tactic commercial actors employ in network ef-
fect markets to maintain their dominant position.
107
Because so much tech-
nology has a networked structure, this strategy is widespread in such mar-
kets: Firms attempt to shore up their market position through a strategy of 
forced incompatibility.
108
For example, during the 1980s, Nintendo rendered 
unauthorized game cartridges incompatible with their gaming systems by 
employing a proprietary ‘lock-out chip’.
109
Fast forward to the present day 
and technology giants still exploit the inherently networked character of 
their market, deploying the strategy of designed incompatibility to lock their 
users into their product ecosystems. It is unlikely to be an accident that, for 
instance, Apple watches, which are explicitly designed as an accessory to 
the iPhone, cannot run on android phones.
Institutional networks, in that they are networked systems, are no dif-
ferent, and indeed many international organizations pursue similar strategies 
(although not conceptualizing them in terms of network effect pressures and 
lock-in). For example, the Russian-led military alliance, the Collective Se-
curity Treaty Organization (“CSTO”), prohibits signatories from holding 
concurrent membership in other security arrangements.
110
Likewise, Article 
8 of NATO may be read as establishing a similar constraint (where dual 
membership conflicts with a state’s obligations under NATO).
111
This is 
forced incompatibility: States are forced to choose a network. Forced in-
compatibility stymies institutional competition because it shrinks the poten-
tial user base available to a rival organization, increasing barriers to entry.
Policymakers, however, must exercise caution in applying this strategy. 
Critical here is an organization’s degree of market dominance. The strategy 
106. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 110, 102.
107. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 110, 111.
108. HANS-WERNER GOTTINGER, ECONOMIES OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES 93
(Routledge, 2003).
109. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 110, 112.
110. MARCEL DE HAAS, RUSSIA’S FOREIGN SECURITY POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
40 (Routledge, 2010).
111. See North Atlantic Treaty art. 8, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 
(“Each Party . . . undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with 
this Treaty.”).
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is effective where the organization already enjoys a substantial degree of 
market share. In such cases, unable to multi-home, members will be forced 
to a decision and, if all else is equal, will choose to remain in the incumbent 
organization. In situations where this is not the case, however, prohibiting 
multi-homing can produce the opposite effect—put to a decision, members 
may abandon an organization and flock to the more robust network. For in-
stance, an organization like NATO is in a strategic market position to pro-
hibit multi-homing. This, however, is not as clear in the case of the CSTO. 
Indeed, since its formation, roughly a quarter of CSTO members have exit-
ed the security agreement
112
while no country has ever left NATO in the 
treaty’s 71-year history.
113
In other cases, allowing member states to multi-
home may be in the interest of an international organization either because it 
will not erode lock-in effect or because it will help the organization gain 
market share if it is struggling to do so.
F. Increasing Coordinating Standards
A final strategy policymakers may pursue to increase lock-in effects is 
to deliberately embed coordinating standards into an organization. This may 
not be possible in many cases. However, where an international organiza-
tion is amenable to the approach, its lock-in effect may be substantially in-
creased through this strategy. So long as some benefit is gleaned from coor-
dination, then the introduction of additional coordinating standards will 
increase an organization’s synchronization value and this will increase its 
lock-in effect.
This strategy will yield its greatest impact on organizations that deal 
with issue areas that resemble pure coordination games (e.g., driving on the 
left or the right-hand side of the road). In such cases, coordinating standards 
may produce a stronger lock-in effect simply because actors have little to no 
incentive to switch to other standards (one is as good as any other) and eve-
ry incentive to continue using the incumbent standard. Examples of such in-
ternational organizations include the UPU, whose principal benefit is coor-
dinating global postal delivery, the International Telecommunication Union 
112. The states that withdrew from the CSTO are Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan 
(Uzbekistan later rejoined the CSTO). See Adil Baguirov & Jason E. Strakes, Former Soviet 
Republics, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 266,
278 (2007) These states did not exit the CSTO because they wished to join another security 
agreement. However, their ease of withdrawal underscores the CSTO’s lack of network lock-
in and thus the danger in this case of forced incompatibility.
113. In 1966, France withdrew from NATO’s military command structure. France, how-
ever, never withdrew from NATO and remained a full-fledged NATO member. France later 
returned to full participation in 2009. See France in Europe: Presentation, FR. MINISTRY 
EUR. & FOREIGN AFFS., https://otan.delegfrance.org/France-and-NATO-presentation-1217
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(“ITU”),
114
which provides common standards for international radio and 
telecommunications, and the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), 
which sets international labor standards.
115
Because the principal benefit of 
these organizations lies in their setting of common standards to facilitate 
synchronization, they are natural candidates for the strategy.
Figure 11. This figure illustrates the powerful network effect pressures 
that institutions providing coordinating standards exert. the chart shows how 
ably the UPU, the ILO, and the ITU gained market consolidation across the 
years. each organization rises on the Y-axis each time the number of sover-
eign states in the international system increases, as they swiftly absorb these 
new nations as member states. note that in 1900 there were approximately 
seventy-seven countries in the international system, 163 countries in 1965, 
and that there are currently 195 countries in the world.
116
Figure 11
114. Established in 1865, the International Telecommunication Union is the oldest truly 
global international organization. See About International Telecommunication Union, ITU,
https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb 12, 2020).
115. See About the International Labour Organization, INT’L LAB. ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang—en/index.htm (Last visited Oct. 12. 2020).
116. See Member Countries, UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION, http://www.upu.int/en/the-
upu/member-countries.html (last visited Feb 18, 2020); Country Profile, INT’L LAB. ORG,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11003:0::NO::: (last visited Feb 
18, 2020); List of Member States, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, https://www.itu.int/online
/mm/scripts/gensel8 (last visited Feb 18, 2020).
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This is, however, less the case for international organizations that deal 
with issue areas that are more accurately described as mixed-motive 
games.
117
In such cases, the lock-in effect of introducing additional coordi-
nating standards will tend to be less pronounced because actors may have 
other concerns that will offset the benefits of coordination. Most interna-
tional organizations address issue areas that resemble mixed-motive games 
rather than pure coordination games. However, even in these cases, there is 
benefit to be had in coordination, and so the introduction of more coordinat-
ing standards will still boost an organization’s lock-in effect—it will just do 
so to less pronounced degrees. By dint of their networked structure, all in-
ternational organizations provide at least some benefits in the form of coor-
dination. How much will depend on the organization in question.
It is, in fact, more accurate to speak of international organizations as ex-
isting along a spectrum. Certain organizations—ones that deal with issue 
areas that lean closer to pure coordination games—will be more hospitable 
to this strategy. The approach’s efficacy, however, will be less pronounced 
in the case of international organizations whose coordinating benefit is 
merely a collateral outcome and not its primary focus. For example, while 
international organizations such as the IMF, the International Maritime Or-
ganization (“IMO”), the WIPO, and the WHO, all establish standards that 
facilitate coordination, coordination in these cases is merely a means to 
achieve the other benefits these organizations strive to provide rather than 
the benefit itself. For instance, while a substantial degree of standardization 
is necessary for the functioning of the WHO, its primary benefits are miti-
gating the effects of disease, strengthening health services, the furnishing of 
aid in emergencies, the eradication of epidemics, and so on and so forth. 
Coordination merely helps achieve these ends; it is not the WHO’s primary 
benefit. All international organizations, however, provide at least some ben-
efit in the form of coordination, and so the lock-in effect of all international 
organizations may be increased through the strategic introduction of coordi-
nating standards—it is just a question of to what extent. The more coordi-
nating standards you can embed into an organization, the more you can off-
set incentives to exit, and the more you turn elements of the institution into 
a coordination game, thus increasing its lock-in effect. Institutions that es-
tablish standards for coordination are the best bet to survive through periods 
of intense global transformation.
International organizations will vary in terms of how structurally recep-
tive they are to the strategies outlined here. Ultimately, their efficacy de-
pends on the specific character of the international organization in question. 
117. These are game structures that provide both opportunities for coordination and con-
flict. A common example of such a game structure is the Battle of the Sexes. In a Battle of the 
Sexes, the parties’ preferences are partly coincident and partly opposed. The classic example 
is a scenario in which a husband wants to attend a football game and the wife wants to see the 
opera, yet both would prefer to do the other’s activity if the alternative is to do their activity 
alone. See Besen & Farrell, supra note 28, at 124–26.
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Some strategies may be very effective with respect to some institutions 
while the same strategy may fall flat in other cases. Policymakers will have 
to pick and choose the most appropriate strategies given their circumstanc-
es. Much is context dependent.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no clearer illustration of the folly of national conceit as the be-
lief that, at this advanced stage of globalization, countries can somehow go 
it alone. Despite the impulse to do so, we no longer have the luxury of re-
treating behind our national barricades. The international system faces chal-
lenges that can only be successfully addressed through international cooper-
ation. How we can sustain multilateral governance is thus a question of the 
highest importance. The concept of treaty hacking and the strategies pro-
posed here are an attempt to provide at least a partial answer, the idea being 
that we can fortify the institutions that comprise the liberal order so that it 
can survive this period of instability. Some limitations to the model should, 
however, be noted.
First, the extent to which increasing an organization’s lock-in effect 
may prevent its collapse is difficult to say with total certainty. Many factors 
may contribute to institutional collapse, which make it hard to draw a 
straight line from a strategy’s implementation to its impact. Indeed, a strate-
gy’s effectiveness can only be confidently assessed in cases where it fails. 
Where an international organization remains stable, we can never be certain 
that this can be attributed to network effect pressures and not to some other 
factor or factors.
Second, the strategies outlined in this article may simply not apply in 
certain cases, and where they do, a range of variables may distort their ef-
fect. In other cases, they may be effective, yet other considerations beyond 
organizational stability may take priority. For example, while network en-
largement may increase the institutional cohesion of NATO, clearly, there 
are important geopolitical implications to expanding NATO that need to be 
carefully weighed. Similarly, while the EU is in theory receptive to the 
strategy of network enlargement, there may be non-structural, political rea-
sons that militate against pursuing such a strategy. Forced incompatibility 
may bolster the market dominance of, for example, the World Food Pro-
gramme (“WFP”), but the world’s hungry may be better served by the exist-
ence of multiple competing organizations that promote food security. The 
usefulness of each strategy would ultimately have to be evaluated on a case 
by case basis.
A further point is that institutional competition may in some circum-
stances not be a bad thing. A strong argument could be made that a degree 
of ‘institutional fluidity’ should be preserved to allow international organi-
zations to evolve. Artificially fortifying organizations limits the force of 
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competition, which, as the argument goes, drives them towards greater effi-
ciency.
118
Indeed, this is the primary concern of the new institutionalists: 
Lock-in may cause sub-optimal institutional arrangements to persist.
119
Locking states into international organizations by ratcheting up network ef-
fect pressures to create what are essentially institutional monopolies may, in 
the long-run, impede the positive development of international legal order. 
Policymakers should be mindful of this danger and seek to balance their ef-
forts to intensify network lock-in with the possible negative consequences 
that their efforts may produce.
Some may also object to the foundational premise upon which the mod-
el rests—that there exists a ‘market’ for international organizations. To this 
point, it should be noted that there is, in a certain respect, nothing structural-
ly unique about state actors. States are concentrations of organizational 
power that cooperate to form larger institutional configurations of influence 
when it suits their purposes and disband them when they do not. Methodo-
logically, it makes little difference if the unit in question is an individual, a 
corporate entity, or a national government—all that is required is that, when 
acting on the international stage, the agent behaves as a unified actor (states 
meet this criterion), the agent acts (generally) in its rational self-interest, and 
that the agent’s choices inform the decisions of other actors within the sys-
tem.
120
If these elements are present, a market model, albeit loosely defined, 
may be applied.
Finally, there is a normative question of whether preserving the current 
international institutional order is even what we want. While the discussion 
mostly made descriptive claims, there was throughout an implicit normative 
assertion that the current United States-led rules-based order should be 
maintained. Many might disagree, seeing the current model of top-down 
global governance as having favored the United States and a small number 
of nations. Some may argue that preserving the current architecture of inter-
national organizations means preserving an implicit ideological bias. For 
instance, many argue that organizations such as the WTO and the IMF rep-
resent and promote specific ideologies and values that may be unjust to-
wards weaker actors in the international system. Entrenching the liberal in-
ternational order may stifle socio-economic pluralism, such as challenges to 
118. Perhaps the most well-known exponent of this efficiency argument is Friedrich 
Hayek. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 58–63 (1960)
119. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 21, at 73–104; Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the 
Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individu-
alist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912, 926 (1994); Gary Hamilton & Robert Feenstra, The 
Organization of Economies, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY, 153, 172–73
(Mary Brinton & Victor Nee, eds., 1998).
120. Some may challenge the assumption that states always act in their rational self-
interest. However, that is not the claim here: The model merely requires that most states act 
rationally most of the time. Perfect rationality is not required. Indeed, history is rife with ex-
amples of state behavior that undercut assumptions of perfect rationality. While imperfect, 
rational choice remains highly useful in building models of state behavior.
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the global trading system initiated from below by regional economic blocs. 
A more interactionist approach would advocate an international legal order 
that grows from a more spontaneous process, and one that takes into ac-
count the social costs of blindly preserving existing international struc-
tures.
121
I leave such questions for the reader to consider. What was offered here 
was a basket of techniques policymakers may deploy to strengthen the cur-
rent constellation of international organizations. Whether this is desirable, 
and with respect to which organizations, are issues not taken up here. Yet 
the question of whether the current liberal institutional model will falter, and 
what to do about it, if anything, is fast pressing down on us. Either way, it is 
a question that we must address and for which we must have an answer.
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see LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 123–29 (1969); PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP 
SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 95–103 (1978). 
With reference to international trade law, see MOSHE HIRSCH, INVITATION TO THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37–38 (2015).

